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they may be accounted for by reversion to the taste or occupation of some progenitor; and it would be interesting to learn how far such early tastes are persistent and influence the future career of the individual. In some instances such tastes die away without apparently leaving any after-effect; but it would be desirable to know how far this is commonly the case, as we should then know whether it were important to direct, as far as this is possible, the early tastes of our children. It may be more beneficial that a child should follow energetically some pursuit of however trifling a nature, and thus acquire perseverance, than that he should be turned from it, because of no future advantage to him.

I will mention one other small point of inquiry in relation to very young children which may possibly prove important with respect to the origin of language; but it could be investigated only by persons possessing an accurate musical ear. Children, even before they can articulate, express some of their feelings and desires by noises uttered in different notes. For instance, they make an interrogative noise and others of assent and dissent in different tones; and it would, I think, be worth while to ascertain whether there is any uniformity in different children in the pitch of their voices under various frames of mind.

I fear that this letter can be of no use to you; but it will serve to show my sympathy and good wishes in your researches.

I beg leave to remain, dear madam, yours faithfully,

CHARLES DARWIN.

To MRS. EMILY TALBOT.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

The Philosophy of Religion must be acknowledged on all hands as the most important work of the human intellect. In explaining religion as a phenomenon of human life, it is found necessary to expound the idea of the first principle of the world—the absolute. In defining his idea of the absolute, man defines his idea of his own origin and destiny, and the idea of the relation which he holds to nature and to the absolute. All practical activity of man is conditioned through this idea of the absolute. Man's immortality and freedom are conditioned directly through the nature of God. If God is an unconscious natural power, man can have no other destiny than to be absorbed at some time into this unconscious power, and lose his individual being. Indeed, on the hypothesis of an unconscious first principle, it is impossible to explain how a conscious being ever came to exist at all. For consciousness is directive power, and the rationality which manifests itself in consciousness is an indefinitely growing potency in the control of the world, perpetually imposing its own forms on brute matter, and subordinating it to the service of man just as if man had made it originally for his own use. The hasty and general outlook is sufficient to give the presumption that the absolute is not only an all-powerful might, but an all-knowing might. The one most important truth of all is the truth in regard to the resemblance or differ-

ence of this first principle from man. If man, as consciousness, is in its image, then the trend of the universe is in the direction of the triumph of man's cause. His development will be an ascent towards the divine. In knowing himself, man will know with some degree of adequacy the divine.

Another consideration of equal importance following from this is the doctrine that God is a revealed God, if He is a conscious Being. His works reveal Him. His creation is a manifestation of His will, and in the creation of intelligent beings He reveals His own intelligence. Hegel has laid great stress upon this thought in his "Philosophy of Religion." In the third part of that treatise he expounds the religion of the "revealed God," calling it "The Absolute Religion," conceiving Christianity to be this absolute religion, and showing by strict analyses of the contents of the other religions that no one of them makes God a revealed God, and that the reason for this is that the idea of God in the pantheistic and polytheistic religions is the idea of a first principle which cannot be revealed in a created world. Neither man nor nature can reveal Brahm, because Brahm is utterly transcendent, not only to the world, but to man in his highest development. Brahm has no form, but transcends consciousness as much as he does material form. With this we have the world of nature and the world of man, not as creations of Brahm, not as revelations of that principle, but as pure illusion—Maya. This illusion is to be accounted for on the hypothesis of the fall of man into individual consciousness, wherein he distinguishes himself from the all. It is "the dream of the drop that hath withdrawn itself from the primal ocean of being," and which colors all its seeing with the defect of its own finitude—consciousness being regarded as the origin of all division and particularity. Its form is that of subject-objectivity; *i. e.*, of a subject which is its own object, and yet a subject which looks upon the object as a world of alien existence—"It says 'thou' to the rest of creation." What momentous import this theory has for the people who believe it we know through the history of the Oriental world—a history which Hegel prefers to exclude from the world-history as being a history that contains no principle of secular progress within it. For it looks upon all as negative

¹ See page 10 of this volume of the *Jour. Spec. Phil.*, where the translator renders the word "offenbare" by "manifest" and "obvious," which is certainly the ordinary signification of "offenbare." But Hegel had in mind the word "Offenbarung," which signifies "revelation" in the technical sense of the term. It is as if Hegel would have used the word "revelate" had he been writing in English, so as to suggest that his "offenbare Religion" is the religion of a God that reveals Himself in His creation as well as in a special "revealed word."

to the divine, and hence as not being capable of improvement, but only fit for annihilation. The highest is Nirvana, or the rest of unconsciousness. Progress towards the annihilation of conscious being is progress towards the divine, as understood in the Orient. Such progress as that we call decay and decease.

With the idea of a revealed God we discover a radically different solution to the world. We find that man has a positive work to do; an active stage of civilization takes the place of Oriental quietism. Man has the vocation to render himself divine by learning the form of God's will as revealed, and then forming his own will in its pattern—adopting God's will as the form of his human will. He must learn the divine will, and make an utter sacrifice of his own will to it, so that his deeds shall be inspired through the divine will, all finitude of the creature being offered up by renunciatory act to the divine, so that the conflict between the divine and human shall be ended by the self-devotion, the utter sacrifice of all selfishness on the part of the individual. The sacrifice of the Oriental devotee relates to the substance of his consciousness, and ends in annihilation, if he can achieve so much as he aspires for. The Christian renunciation does not go so far; it recognizes in God the Absolute form, instead of an absolute formlessness. God has the form of Consciousness, of Personality. Hence, with this idea of the divine, the sacrifice of the individual for the divine is no annihilation of individuality, but rather the putting on the form of the freest and highest individuality. The sacrifice which the Christian devotee makes is no sacrifice of his human form, but only of its content; he takes into the form of his will and knowing a divine substance, the substance revealed as the will of God, and by this he preserves his individuality, and yet removes the barrier between himself and the divine through utter abandonment of self to the will of the divine will, which, being the will of a conscious personality, restores to man his sacrificed individuality in a transfigured form. Man, by his religious sacrifice, therefore, gains all and loses nothing but finitude and defect. The doctrine of Grace, as the highest principle of divine action towards the world of man and nature, is the only doctrine in harmony with the idea of a revelation of God through creation. Were God any other than conscious personality, man and nature would reveal something essentially different from Him. A world which offers us a series of beings ascending from the inorganic to the organic, and crowns all with a human race, reveals a conscious first principle by pointing towards it as the final cause of its progressive series. It points towards such a divine principle, and only towards it.

Man, too, is a being who can develop within himself—he can collect
1 4 * XV—14

experience from the individuals of his species and redistribute this experience to the individual—thus elevating the life of the individual into the life of the species, and without destroying the latter's individuality, but, on the contrary, increasing it. For in our human affairs the man goes for most who has taken up into himself the life and experience of his fellow-men most effectually. Shakespeare and Goethe, Homer and Dante—these are vast individualities, comprehending human nature almost entire within each. Man is great when he avails himself of the power of his species. Even the Cæsar or the Napoleon is great through his representative character—summing up in his will the will-power of his nation and distributing it again to them as directive power. Each humble individual, too, who serves under the Cæsar or the Napoleon participates to some extent in the greatness of individuality of the great leader, because he is led out of and beyond himself to live for others and through others and in others. Thus each one gains individuality while he gives it to others. Here, in secular affairs, is the same principle which the doctrine of Grace enunciates for the religious consciousness. Since the day of Saint Augustine, who was the first to see the absoluteness of the principle of Grace (among the Christian Fathers), we have had, as the chief interest in the history of the Church, the attempt to realize this principle in all its consequences.

It is possible to seize the principle of Grace in an abstract manner, and set it over against other principles, such as justice and free-will. Or it is possible to misunderstand it altogether, as in the case of naturalistic theories which can think of no possible view of interrelation except the materialistic one, which admits of no participation but only of exclusion. Justice is not a principle which is to be thought as limiting grace; grace itself assumes the form of justice in proportion as it meets the free responsibility of the individual. Without responsibility there can be no justice; for justice returns upon the individual only what he has uttered in freedom. But the principle of grace extends below the realm of free responsibility to the lowest manifestation of the creation. It is grace that draws up all creation towards the highest, and endows beings with progressive degrees of individuality and realization of the divine image. The animal, it is true, is not immortal, but so much life as it has is the life of the species, and is a gift of grace which gives him the light of life, not for his having a right to it, but for the sake of divine love which pours itself out in creation, from freedom and the desire of good. When the human being arrives, he progresses into knowledge and will-power, and this brings responsibility, and with it the principle of justice. Justice is the principle of grace applied to free beings, because justice is respect shown

to the responsibility of the individual who acts. Justice assumes the actor to be self-determined and free and to own his deed ; whatever his deed is, it is returned to him. To return the deed of an irresponsible being upon it would be to annihilate it. To treat a free being as though it did not own its deeds would be to offer indignity to it and annihilate its freedom. But freedom is itself the last and highest gift of grace, and grace will preserve that before all else. Freedom is self-determination, but not the self-determination of a mere particular individual in its isolation, but rather as participation in the life of the species—in the life of God, rather. Freedom, which should energize to will only its particularity, apart from the divine and from the human race, would merely set up for itself a limit in the race and in God. This would be the hell which selfishness makes for itself. Even grace, which seeks to give to others, receiving naught in return, would be the highest pain to the isolated will that seeks to find itself alone in the universe. Dante makes his "Inferno" to be caused by the fall of Lucifer, through pride, he striking the earth and hollowing out the vortex with its terraces on which sinners are punished. Pride is the worst of mortal sins, because it loves only itself and repels God and man and all that is valued by them. Grace is the most repugnant to pride. Next to pride is the sin of envy. But envy is not so deadly as pride in that it does not hate all that is from others. It hates God and man, but it loves the temporal blessings which they possess, and desires to possess them exclusively itself. Next above envy is anger, or that which does violence to its fellows and against God. Anger is not so deep a sin as envy or as pride ; for it strikes the particular individual or special persons, but not the foundation of all society and of all union with God, while pride and envy are hostile to all association whether with man or with God.

Christianity defines the "mortal sins" from this view of divine grace. Freedom is turned against itself for its own annihilation in these sins, because it wills against participation in the life of the species as well as in the divine life. It is the principle of grace, which Goethe, in the second part of his "Faust," calls the eternal-feminine, "Das Ewig-Weibliche," which is the moving principle of all progress towards the goal. Goethe, like Dante, makes divine love or grace the very element that is most painful to the devils who undertake to seize Faust's soul. Association is the most destructive agency which fiendishness can come in contact with. The angels appear in the clouds strewing roses (of love), which the devils find to be the most exquisite torture when they are struck by them. Even the association of devils for a purpose is liable to undermine the absolute hate which is the ideal of the perfect devil. Slavery would

undermine it, for the slave would be forced into submission of his will to another; and to toil for another is to sacrifice one's self for that other, and to some extent to realize the principle of grace. So if Mephistopheles controls other devils he realizes his purposes in and through them, and they subordinate their individual wills to his will—thus simulating the principle of grace—thus deep is the principle of grace constitutive of the nature of the human world and of the forms of human life. Even slavery has a positive side to it, which is medicative towards those worst of spiritual ills—pride and envy. Goethe had come to this view of grace during his life, starting with the pantheistic theory, and finding its consequences inhuman; not even devils could live under such a theory. There was a glimpse of the true theory of the world in his mind quite early in life, and he tells us that he saw the Faust problem then in its entirety, first and second parts. He had seen that the universe is based in its deepest laws on the principle of "saving grace." The three phases of holiness in the Christian church are portrayed by him in the last scene of "Faust." There comes first the Pater Ecstaticus, who calls upon arrows to transfix him (as they did St. Sebastian), and for lances, bludgeons, and lightnings to martyr him, so that his "pining breast" may be rid of its "vain unrealities, and see only the star of everlasting love." This view is simply negative to the finite and earthly. Pater Profundus comes next as the representative of a more perfect state of holiness. He looks upon nature and sees it as the spectacle of God's love forming and preserving created beings. Not only this, but he sees that even the lightning and the terrible mountain torrent are messengers of love, bringing fertility to the vale and purity to the air; he sees the world as instrument for the realization of spirit. There is next Pater Seraphicus, who is a higher saint, because he does not spurn the world and seek only his own bliss in ecstatic contemplation, nor see merely the mediatorial process in creation, like the Pater Profundus, but he "takes up into himself the blessed boys . . . brought forth at midnight hour, with a soul and sense half shut, lost immediate to the parents, by the angels straightway gained . . ."; lets them see the world through his eyes, and, by allowing them participation in his human experience, equalizes their fate which had denied them earthly life. Here we see that the soul is represented as gaining something positive from the earthly life which must be made up to it by the gracious aid of some Pater Seraphicus if too early death has deprived it of human experience. But Dr. Marianus ("in the highest, purest cell") sees the Virgin as the symbol of divine grace (as the feminine is especially the bearer of human tenderness and mercy on earth, so it becomes properly a symbol of divine grace), and thus celebrates divine grace as the deep-

est principle of the divine nature, and as containing all other principles within it.

Milton, in representing the fallen angels as having society and combination, in the form of a hellish commonwealth, with a legislative assembly over which Satan "exalted sat," has painted the demoniac as possessing divine elements. It is Dante alone who has consistently presented to us the symbolic portraiture of the degrees of sin in its effects upon the soul, and has shown us Lucifer "immersed to his midst in ice," his pride repelling all the universe, and thus freezing him with isolation—for warmth is the symbol of association—even our clothing warms us by contact, and we warm our spiritual capacities into activity by association, contact with other souls, so that love is regarded as spiritual warmth. The institution of the State and of Civil society, of the family, and still more the institution of the Church, weave for human life a spiritual clothing—the universal enwrapping the particular—and preserve vital heat within it.

If these views are correct, it is not wonderful that the great fathers of the Christian church, who have seen this principle of grace revealed as the ground of true life and the solvent word that alone explains creation, have laid so much stress upon it as to make it seem often as the exclusive principle rather than the inclusive principle. Hence justice has been opposed to grace and stern legality made to stand over against grace, simply because the principle of grace was interpreted in a one-sided manner. Then, too, freedom has been thrust back as if it had been impossible with divine sovereignty; when, in fact, it is grace alone that makes freedom possible. For freedom is participation in the form of the absolute, and hence the realization of independence which alone can be conceived through the idea of love or grace which freely imparts itself to others and lives in their living.

Even the knowing or consciousness is made possible through the participation in the divine. "We see all things in God," says Malebranche, but the remark is not original with him, for it is simply a statement of the doctrine that he had learned in the Catholic teaching of the college of La Marche and of the Sorbonne. For four hundred years the Catholic schools had been teaching the doctrines of Aquinas and Albertus Magnus, which taught that the very simplest form of knowing, the simple sensuous certitude, is a consciousness that the me and the not-me are united in one predicate—that of BEING—which is perceived to be both subjective and objective at once, the ground of the me and of the not-me. This is "*lux intelligibilis*" which Aquinas speaks of (in *librum Boet. de Trin.*, Qu. 1). He says that this intuition of Being in the first act of sense-perception is an intuition of God (in an imperfect manner it is true, but still)

the knowing of that which is utterly universal as regards any mere subjective point of view. He calls this knowing of the primal intuition whereby all knowing of things becomes possible INTELLIGERE. (*Objectum intellectus est ens vel verum commune.—Quaest. lv, Art. I, Summa I.*) This common or universal principle which is the criterion of truth is that through which we reduce the unknown objects to known ones—resolving them by means of this common principle which is both subjective and objective (*Illud quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens.—Quaest. Disp., quaest. I, De Veritate, Art. I.*)

This primary category of the mind through which we cognize (see *Jour. Spec. Phil.* for Jan., 1879, page 90; also *Introd. to Phil.*, Chap. iii, page 115 of *Jour. Spec. Phil.*, Vol. I) is, according to Italian philosophy, a divine light, the intuition of God as the Absolute, although, of course, only the most incomplete act of knowing possible, because it cognizes merely the abstract being and not the concrete nature of the divine. Yet it is grace, inasmuch as it imparts itself, reveals itself to the mind, and makes the mind see itself and its object in the light (*lumen*) thus given it. The retention of this insight by the Italians has kept them from the tendency to subjective idealism, like that of Berkeley and Hume, and has made the German philosophy proceeding from Kant seem to them a most unwarranted procedure, for the reason that it solves a difficulty that is itself purely imaginary. For why should it solve subjective idealism by admitting it and then proceeding to construct the world according to it, when all subjective idealism rests on a mistake in regard to the first and most simple act of knowing? For, according to the psychology of the school that comes down from Thomas Aquinas, the category of Being is seen to be both subjective and objective at once, and this perception is what constitutes cognition. Hence cognition cannot be merely subjective when it relates to the recognition of objects.

Connected with this idea in psychology is the ontological proof of the existence of God by Saint Anselm. This sets out by showing that in all cognition there is implied the idea of a Totality to which all our ideas are referred, as a norm. "*Illud quo majus cogitari non potest*" is the thought of the totality and the thought of God as to its general form, but an inadequate thought, only the true first condition in the thought of God. This thought of the totality becomes the thought of God, adequately, in proportion as the determining thoughts are added which make our idea clear as to the attributes of God. The idea of totality involves that of independence and freedom, as well as that of self-determination; and self-determination involves, again, that of self-consciousness and will.

It is true that the concreter ideas of consciousness and will are not directly involved, so that one can see them immediately following from the statement of the former, but, nevertheless, they follow as strictly, though by many intermediate steps. The opponents of the ontological proof of God always assume the same standpoint that the proof assumes, but naively overlook the fact and make the proof to be merely fanciful. Gaunilo asserts that the thought of the lost island in the Atlantic does not prove its real existence, wherefore Anselm's "Than which no greater can be thought" is a concept which does not imply necessary existence. But this very objection rests on the assumption that Anselm's concept may be a merely subjective one, and that there may be an objective which transcends it, and that the objective plus the subjective make up the totality. He would not find it possible to think a greater than the totality, nor to think the totality otherwise than as existent. "The All exists," is the purport of Anselm's assertion. To this he adds that the All is perfect (because it lacks nothing, there being nothing outside it for it to need; and, besides this, it is no becoming or process of development because it is total and has arrived at its goal—only finite time can separate that which is potential from its realization, and in a totality this time has been long since transcended). He concludes, too, that the All is good (for good implies self-end and self-mediation for that end, and in the totality there can be no conflict of end and means with the self). The totality is God, therefore, and the thought of it underlies all thinking—even the thinking of the fool, who says in his heart that there is no God. But the All must not be taken in the sense of a mere collection—a "*tout ensemble*," as the French call it. Such a totality would be only quantitative unity, which would, however, be soon modified in thought into the idea of a process of determination of each part by the influence of the totality of conditions in the world. This would result in the idea of fate or blind Power, which, as a universal might, destroyed the particular beings of the world. The further thought upon the nature of fate would discover that self-determination was the basis to any possible form of totality, and hence that the totality must be personal and free, and that a world of particular beings with origination, change and decay, was to be explained, not as a part of the totality, but as its manifestation, as its creation. Then would follow the thought of the creation of beings which reflect the total or absolute person, and finally thought would begin to understand the world in which it finds itself.

THE EDITOR.